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ABSTRACT 
The public good nature of ecosystem services has historically 
frustrated their inclusion within a traditional free-market framework.  
The inherent attributes of public goods—joint consumption and the 
inability to exclude users—vitiate incentives for their efficient provision 
and production through conventional markets.  Government 
intervention typically has been necessary to correct this market failure 
with respect to other traditional public goods, such as law enforcement, 
national defense, and transportation infrastructure.  Correspondingly, 
government intervention will be requisite in correcting market failures 
to supply ecosystem service public goods, such as climate regulation.  
The mechanisms by which government can correct these market 
failures are contingent upon the nature of the public good itself, and 
range from command-and-control approaches to market incentives.  
Where private good attributes are present, such as excludability and 
non-joint consumption, quasi-market incentives may be employed in 
concert with command-and-control strategies to supply a public good. 
Climate regulation ecosystem services, especially those provided 
by forests, are unique in that carbon can act as a proxy of the services 
provided.  Because carbon exhibits many private good attributes, 
market approaches can be employed to provide climate regulation 
services.  However, while voluntary markets for ecosystem services 
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currently exist in the United States, these are unlikely to produce an 
efficient level of the ecosystem service due to insufficient demand and 
the persistence of free-ridership problems.  Government regulation will 
be necessary to complement these market approaches, establishing 
compliance markets that induce demand for ecosystem service proxies, 
set standards, and foreclose on free-ridership.  Many ecosystem services 
are difficult or costly to measure directly, thus the government also 
must establish rigorous standards and guidelines to ensure the veracity 
of the proxies used.  Using traditional public goods as a template, 
federal policy can help create private interests in commonly owned 
ecosystem services, fostering a vigorous, profitable exchange of goods 
and services while providing for the restoration and maintenance of the 
ecosystems that provide these services. 
In the United States, natural systems currently offset roughly one-
fifth of total carbon emissions, largely via forest sequestration.  
Maintaining and increasing this percentage is essential for the United 
States to meet its climate and energy goals.  Thus, the federal role in this 
ecosystem service market must address both the direct goods traded 
from any individual ownership (tons of emissions reductions 
sequestered on a specific parcel of land) and the larger ecosystem 
(forests and other natural lands) that provide context and stability for 
the function of that parcel. 
The federal government must establish policies mandating that: 
1. The underlying regulatory structure of the markets 
established via “cap and trade” legislation includes forest and 
other land sequestration as part of that system; 
2. The “rules of the game” for the offset and trading market 
recognize that biological carbon regulatory compliance units, 
or RCUs (as opposed to voluntary offsets), are integrally 
dependent upon the ecosystem that provides them; and 
3. There is investment in securing the natural infrastructure of 
land that provides the basic “factory” producing these 
ecosystem services to the market. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
To establish ecosystem markets, the government must develop 
systems to reconcile the often opposing forces of markets and the 
public trust.  Ecosystem markets are distinguished by the fact they 
provide private goods, such as carbon emission reductions, that are 
premised on sustaining public goods, such as the climate regulation 
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services provided by forest ecosystems.  While largely voluntary in 
the United States to date, ecosystem service markets are unlikely to 
fully achieve the goals of either the market or the public good without 
federal structuring and standards.  Federal policy can help create 
private property interests in commonly owned ecosystem services, 
fostering a vigorous, profitable exchange of goods and services while 
providing for the restoration and maintenance of the ecosystems that 
provide these services. 
The advantages of using markets in combination with regulatory 
approaches to achieve public policy goals have emerged more clearly 
in the last two decades.  Voluntary ecosystem service markets must 
evolve and adapt to a quasi-regulatory approach if the goals of both 
public policy and the market are to be fully realized.  The federal role 
in this quasi-regulatory approach includes many of the same essential 
functions and partnering as other private-sector economies, such as 
law enforcement, transportation, education and energy.  It also 
includes the establishment of standards to maintain the systems that 
provide these goods and services.  Where ecosystem services arise on 
private lands, federal partnerships with the private-sector are key to 
the success of ecosystem markets.  Government investment must be 
made in the development of the production capacity of these goods 
and services.  Standards and guidelines regarding the services to be 
provided must be defined by the government to both reduce market 
risk and ensure consumer safety, but also to ensure that these take 
into account the viability of the ecosystem from which these services 
spring, not just the private service or good itself. 
Of the various ecosystem services for which private market 
mechanisms are likely to prove effective, those relating to global 
climate stabilization hold considerable promise.  In the United States, 
natural systems currently offset nearly one-fifth of total national 
emissions, largely via forest sequestration.1  Maintaining and 
increasing this percentage is essential if the U.S. is to meet its climate 
goals.  Tons of carbon emissions reductions can be used as a 
convenient proxy measurement for targets in achieving climate 
stabilization.  Thus, the federal role in this ecosystem services market 
must address both the direct goods traded from individual ownership 
(tons of emissions reductions sequestered on a specific parcel of land) 
and the larger ecosystem (forests and other natural lands) that 
 
 1. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND 
SINKS: 1990–2007 ch. 7 ¶ 24 (2008). 
Wayburn_final_PD edt.doc 7/30/2010  4:43:58 PM 
388 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 20:385 
provide context and stability for the function of that parcel. 
More specifically, in order to realize the value of the ecosystem 
service of climate regulation, the federal government must establish 
policies mandating that: 
1. The underlying regulatory structure of the markets 
established via “cap and trade” legislation includes forest and 
other land sequestration as part of that system; 
2. The “rules of the game” for the offset and trading market 
recognize that biological carbon regulatory compliance units, 
or “RCUs” (as opposed to voluntary offsets), are integrally 
dependent upon the ecosystems that provides them; and 
3. There is investment in the natural infrastructure that 
provides the basic “factory” producing these ecosystem 
services for the market. 
In the first area, “cap and trade” legislation (be it trade, dividend 
or other) must fully include the role of natural systems as both 
essential actors for sequestration and sources of emissions.  The 
legislation must also require accurate accounting for the transfers of 
carbon tons within and between emissions sectors that are linked, 
such as forests, which sequester carbon, and energy or transportation, 
which may utilize wood as a fuel source.  Lastly, legislation must 
require accounting systems that reflect the carbon flows transmitted 
to or sequestered from the atmosphere, regardless of whether these 
are from capped (energy) or uncapped sectors (natural systems).  
Emissions reductions from natural systems should be fully tradable 
with those from other sectors once the accounting requirements, and 
the definitional and quality requirements noted below, are met. 
In the second area, the essential role of the federal government is 
in defining the quality standards for a ton of emissions reductions 
such that these are fungible across all sectors.  While much progress 
has been made in defining basic standards for voluntary offsets, such 
as with the Climate Action Reserve,2 those for regulatory compliance, 
RCUs, will only be defined as regulatory programs such as 
California’s AB 32 become established.3  These RCUs will be used to 
meet any regulatory cap established to help stabilize climate, thus it is 
essential that they meet not only metrics for carbon within a specific 
site, but also reflect that such carbon tons are derived from sustained 
 
 2. CLIMATE ACTION RESERVE, FOREST PROJECT PROTOCOL 2–3 (Version 3.1 2009). 
 3. CAL HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 38550 (West 2009). 
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ecosystems that will endure sufficiently to meet climate stabilization 
goals over time. 
The third proposed role for the federal government is a 
traditional one that involves sharing the cost of developing new 
markets, especially lowering the cost of capital by partnering to invest 
in necessary infrastructure development.  Here the federal 
government should invest in securing and restoring the “factories” of 
ecosystems that provide essential sequestration services.  This would 
be parallel to investments in the energy sector in which the 
government shares in the costs of building new physical 
infrastructure, such as generation facilities.4  Given the major 
bifurcation in federal and private land ownership in the United 
States,5 investment should be tailored to each ownership type and the 
threats to sequestration connected to each ownership type.  The 
investments should be directed at addressing those threats.  Hence, 
on federal lands, investments for climate should be focused on 
restoration that will maintain resilient, adaptive ecosystem carbon 
stocks.  On private lands, federal investment should be helping 
prevent conversion of forests, especially via conservation easements.  
This will maintain the forestland base and the basis for sequestration.  
Overall, federal investment in ensuring the sequestration services of 
both public and private lands should be commensurate with the value 
of the net emissions reductions these lands provide. 
This paper investigates the role of federal policy in establishing 
ecosystem service markets, focusing specifically on the establishment 
of markets for the climate change mitigation benefits conveyed by 
forests.  It reviews the underlying economic theory behind the historic 
market treatment of forests and the services they provide, and uses 
this as a basis for elucidating the role of government in establishing an 
ecosystem service market for forest carbon.  Part II introduces the 
science behind forests and climate change, and the ways in which 
forest management regimes can render forest ecosystems as either an 
asset or a liability with respect to global climate change. It addresses 
the services forests provide and investigates the manner in which 
these services have or have not been incorporated into traditional 
market frameworks and the implications of such treatment.  Part III 
 
 4. Joshua P.  Fershee, Misguided Energy: Why Recent Legislative, Regulatory, and Market 
Initiatives are Insufficient to Improve the US Energy Infrasatructure, 44 HARV.  J.  ON LEGIS.  
327, 347–48 (2007). 
 5. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., GTR-NC-241, FOREST RESOURCES OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 2002 at 3 (2005). 
Wayburn_final_PD edt.doc 7/30/2010  4:43:58 PM 
390 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 20:385 
explores the economic theory behind the provision and production of 
traditional public goods while Part IV uses this as a basis to inform 
future strategies for maximizing the climate services afforded by 
forests.  Finally, parts V and VI draw upon the preceding analysis to 
articulate the role of the government in establishing an effective, 
robust ecosystem service market for forest climate benefits. 
II. FORESTS AND CLIMATE 
The warming of the global climate system has been recognized 
from observations of increased global average air and ocean 
temperatures, melting of snow and ice, and a rising global average sea 
level.  Most of the increases in global average temperature since the 
mid-twentieth century have been attributed to rapidly increasing 
concentrations of anthropogenic greenhouse gases.  Between 1970 
and 2004, annual emissions of carbon dioxide, the most important 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas, increased by 80 percent.6  Global 
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other 
anthropogenic greenhouse gases have been increasing in the 
atmosphere since 1750, and now far exceed the atmospheric 
concentrations preceding industrialization.  Unless strategies are 
pursued to abate emissions and mitigate atmospheric concentrations 
of greenhouse gases, a changing climate will increase the risk of 
disruption to ecological, social, and political systems across the globe.7 
U.S. forests play an integral role in global climate regulation by 
reducing net greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere.  Together, the 
public and private lands that compose our domestic forests sequester 
and store about one-fifth of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions 
annually.8  Despite the tremendous value our forests provide in 
stemming climate change,9 their continued ability to furnish these 
carbon sequestration services is not guaranteed, and in many cases is 
being undermined by a variety of market forces and public policies.10  
 
 6. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Groups I, II, and III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, ¶ 36 (Nov.  
2007) (prepared by Rajendra K. Pachauri & Andy Reisinger). 
 7. Id. at 37. 
 8. See U.S.  ENVTL.  PROT.  supra note 1, ch. 7 ¶ 24 (2008). 
 9. R.K. Dixon et al., Carbon Pools and Flux of Global Forest Ecosystems, 263 SCIENCE 
185, 188 (1994). 
 10. See U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., PNW-GTR-797  FOREST-LAND 
CONVERSION, ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, AND ECONOMIC ISSUES FOR POLICY: A REVIEW 3 
(2009); Christopher L. Lant, J.B. Ruhl & Steven E. Kraft, The Tragedy of Ecosystem Services, 
58 BIOSCIENCE 969, 974 (2008). 
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U.S. public and private forests vary considerably in terms of 
ownership objectives, management histories, and current forest 
conditions.11  As a result, each faces a related, but unique, suite of 
challenges that threaten their continued ability to sequester and store 
carbon. 
A.  Climate Duality of Forests 
Forests have a dual role with respect to climate.  As stated 
earlier, forest ecosystems sequester and store vast amounts of carbon 
when conserved, providing an important service in the regulation of 
global climate.12  Conversely, when forests are disturbed, the carbon 
stored within these ecosystems is emitted, releasing greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere.13  Further, the consequences of forest conversion 
are not simply a discrete, one-time release of greenhouse gases into 
the atmosphere.14  In addition to the emission of the biological carbon 
stored within forest ecosystems, conversion also sacrifices the future 
sequestration capacity of these ecosystems.15  Hence, the conversion 
of forests both increases the quantity of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere, exacerbating global climate change, and undermines our 
ability to remove these gases from the atmosphere in the future.16  
Indeed, the historic clearing of global forests has vastly reduced our 
current global forest area, and is responsible for nearly 35 percent of 
total anthropogenic carbon emissions in the atmosphere today.17 
Over 1.5 million acres of private U.S. forestland are lost to 
conversion and development annually, thereby emitting the biological 
 
 11. See U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., FS-874, INTERIM UPDATE OF THE 2000 
RENEWABLE RESOURCES PLANNING ACT ASSESSMENT 28–29 (2007). 
 12. Dixon et al., supra note 9, at 188–89. 
 13. Kurt S. Pregitzer & Eugénie. S. Euskirchen, Carbon Cycling and Storage in World 
Forests: Biome Patterns Related to Forest Age, 10 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 2052, 2052 
(2004). 
 14. William R. Emanuel & George G. Killough, Modeling Terrestrial Ecosystems in the 
Global Carbon-Cycle with Shifts in Carbon Storage Capacity by Land-Use Change, 65 ECOLOGY 
970, 978–79 (1984). 
 15. Andreas Fischlin et al., Ecosystems, Their Properties, Goods, and Service, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTIONS OF WORKING 
GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 211, 221 (2007). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Jeanine M. Rhemtulla et al., Historical Forest Baselines Reveal Potential for Continued 
Carbon Sequestration, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6082, 6082 (2009); see also R.A.  Houghton, 
The Annual Net Flux of Carbon to the Atmosphere from Changes in Land Use 1850–1990, 
TELLUS 51B, 298 (1999). 
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carbon stored in these ecosystems and sacrificing the future 
sequestration potential of these lands.18  Over the next half century, 
this trend is expected to continue, and an additional 50 to 75 million 
acres of private forestland are projected to be lost to conversion and 
development.19  While afforestation and reforestation efforts may 
offset some of this loss, the climate benefits of newly planted forests 
cannot begin to replace the vast carbon storage and sequestration 
potential forgone when mature forests are converted.20  As a 
consequence of earlier land use patterns on private lands, many 
forests are now characterized by younger stands, which store far less 
carbon than mature forests.21  Allowing these forests to grow older 
will result in substantially greater stores over time, if they are allowed 
to remain as forest.22 
Public forests, while composing roughly one-third of the total 
U.S.  forestland, store substantially more carbon per acre on average 
than do private forests.  These public forests are the cornerstone of 
the United States’ ability to combat climate change through biological 
sequestration.23  However, with the exacerbation of forest stressors 
posed by a changing climate, public forests and their attendant carbon 
stocks are also at increasing risk of disturbance and emission.24  
Ensuring the ongoing robustness and resilience of public forests, and 
capitalizing on the vast untapped carbon storage potential of the 
remaining private forestlands, which account for nearly 60 percent of 
all domestic forestlands, will be critical to addressing climate change.25 
B.  Ecosystem Services 
The carbon sequestration provided by our nation’s forests is an 
example of an ecosystem service.  Ecosystem services have been 
 
 18. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., FS-874., supra note 11, at 20 (23 million acres 
converted between 1982 and 1997, or 1.5 million annually). 
 19. See id. at 5. 
 20. Sebastian Luyssaert et al., Old-Growth Forests as Global Carbon Sinks, 455 NATURE 
213, 213 (2008). 
 21. See Jeanine M. Rhemtulla et al., supra note 17, 6082. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Richard Birdsey et al., Mitigation Activities in the Forest Sector to Reduce Emissions 
and Enhance Sinks of Greenhouse Gases, in U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., RMRS-
GTR-59, THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON AMERICA’S FORESTS: A TECHNICAL 
DOCUMENT SUPPORTING THE 2000 USDA FOREST SERVICE RPA ASSESSMENT 112, 112 
(2000). 
 24. Constance I. Millar et al., Climate Change and Forests of the Future: Managing in the 
Face of Uncertainty, 17 ECOLOGY APPLICATIONS 2145, 2149–50 (2007). 
 25. See e.g., Jeanine M.  Rhemtulla et al., supra note 17, at 6084–85. 
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broadly defined as the processes of ecosystems that directly or 
indirectly support human wellbeing.26  These services may be grouped 
into four broad categories according to the functions they perform: 
regulation, habitat, production, and information functions.27  
Regulation functions relate to the capacity of ecosystems to regulate 
essential ecological processes, such as the regulation of global climate, 
through bio-geochemical and biospheric processes.  In addition to 
maintaining ecosystem and biosphere health, regulation functions 
provide substantial direct and indirect benefits to humans, such as 
clean air, water, soil, and biological control services.28  Habitat 
functions refer to the services ecosystems offer in the provision of 
refuge and reproductive habitat for flora and fauna, the conservation 
of evolutionary processes, and biological and genetic diversity.29  
Production functions pertain to the creation of ecosystem goods 
through photosynthesis and nutrient uptake by autotrophs.  These 
functions create a wide variety of carbohydrate structures, many of 
which provide goods for human consumption, ranging from food to 
raw materials to energy resources.30  Information functions refer to 
the maintenance of human health that ecosystems offer through the 
provision of opportunities for recreation, cognitive development, 
aesthetic experiences and spiritual enrichment.31 
While all of these services are important, regulation functions are 
essential to a healthy, functioning biosphere, and are therefore 
necessary for the maintenance of all other ecosystem functions.  In 
the context of climate change, the regulation functions provided by 
the atmosphere and ecosystems like forests are of critical importance 
to the overall health and functioning of the global biosphere.  
Because the maintenance of global climate is a regulation function, 
the diminishment of climate services through the continued 
concentration of atmospheric carbon has implications for the other 
ecosystems functions contingent upon climate regulation.32 
 
 26. See, e.g., Marc Levy et al., Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Current State and 
Trends, 1 ECOSYSTEMS & HUMAN WELL-BEING 123 (2005). 
 27. Rudolf S. de Groot et al., A Typology for the Classification, Description and Valuation 
of Ecosystem Functions, Goods, and Services, 41 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 393, 394–95 (2002). 
 28. Id. at 396–97. 
 29. Id. at 395. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 396. 
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C. An Intersection of “Tragedies” 
While production functions generally result in the creation of 
discrete, easily commoditized ecosystem goods, such as timber and 
mineral resources, regulation functions provide services that are less 
concrete in nature, and do not lend themselves to ready 
quantification or exchange in the traditional marketplace.  As a 
result, conventional markets often fail to efficiently and cost-
effectively support the services arising from regulation functions, 
leading instead to the degradation and destruction of these services in 
favor of production functions.33  The market failure of forest 
ecosystem services is even more unique, however, because it falls at 
the intersection of two distinct environmental “tragedies”: A lack of 
internalized positive and negative externalities. 
1.  The “Tragedy of the Commons” 
Degradation of the global climate is a classic example of Garrett 
Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons.”34  While Hardin’s definition of 
the “commons” has since been clarified as actually describing “open-
access” resources, this seminal work has catalyzed the analysis of 
market failure in the context of common-pool resources such as the 
atmosphere.35  The “tragedy” to which Hardin referred was that of an 
open-access resource, where property rights to moderate resource 
usage were poorly developed or non-existent.36  This is distinct from a 
commons, which refers to a property rights regime that determines 
the rules by which a community may access and use a common-pool 
resource.37  In the absence of common property laws, a common-pool 
resource like the atmosphere becomes an open-access resource, 
which can be exploited to collapse.  This destruction is the inevitable 
outcome Hardin describes as resulting from the “remorseless working 
of things.”38 
Open-access resources are characterized by non-excludability 
and subtractability.  The first characteristic, that of non-excludability, 
refers to the difficulty inherent in excluding users from an open-
 
 33. Franz W. Gatzweiler, Organizing a Public Ecosystem Service Economy for Sustaining 
Biodiversity, 59 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 296, 298–99 (2005). 
 34. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243–48 (1968). 
 35. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Lant, Ruhl, & Kraft, supra note 10, at 969. 
 38. Hardin, supra note 34, at 1244; Lant, Ruhl, & Kraft, supra note 10, at 969. 
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access resource.39  The second characteristic, subtractability, refers to 
the diminishment (or subtraction) of value that the exploitation of an 
open-access resource by one user incurs for other users.40  Emitting 
carbon is an example of using an open-access resource, namely, using 
the atmosphere as a waste receptacle. 
Because of the amorphous nature of many ecosystem services, 
quantification of value in reliable, discrete terms is often difficult.  
This frustrates the ability to clearly define property rights governing 
the use of an environmental resource, and the subsequent assignment 
of pecuniary value to harms and benefits associated with its use.  
Without a defined value or property right, excluding users or holding 
them accountable for their use can be difficult or impossible.  
Consequently, conventional markets are unable to accurately account 
for the costs and benefits associated with open-access resources, and 
tend to fail with respect to an efficient allocation of resource use.41 
2.  Externalized Costs 
Though the parties responsible for using an open-access resource 
may not incur the costs of their resource use, their actions certainly 
do have costs.  Currently, society at large bears these costs in the form 
of reduced air quality and a disruption of global climate regulation 
services.  These externalized costs, or negative externalities, are borne 
by outside parties while the resource user exclusively enjoys the 
benefits derived from the externality-inducing activity.42  In the 
absence of regulation, emitters may freely use the atmosphere as a 
medium to dispose of waste emissions.  The atmosphere as an open-
access resource exhibits partial subtractability in this respect; when 
one group of users utilizes it as a repository for waste emissions, its 
utility may be diminished for other uses.  Society at large, which relies 
on the atmosphere as a resource to maintain air quality and provide 
key ecosystem services like climate regulation, finds these other use 
values marginalized by excessive emissions.  Yet, because the 
 
 39. Vincent Ostrom & Elinor Ostrom, Public Goods and Public Choices, in: 
POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES (Michael D. McGinnis, ed., University of 
Michigan Press 1999). 
 40. Elinor Ostrom et al., Revisiting The Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, 284 
SCIENCE 278, 278–79 (1999); OSTROM & OSTROM, supra note 39; Thomas Dietz et al., The 
Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 SCIENCE 1907, 1907 (2003). 
 41. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH.  L.  REV. 570, 577–84 
(1996). 
 42. ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, 174, 183–188 (Macmillan and Co., 
4th ed. 1932) (1920). 
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externalized costs of greenhouse gas emissions are currently omitted 
from the economic calculus of individual emitters, the market dictates 
overuse of the resource as a waste-storage medium.43  As a result, 
even if the costs society collectively bears in terms of reduced air 
quality and diminished climate regulation exceed the individual 
benefits emitters enjoy, there is no incentive to limit emissions 
because the responsible actors only bear a fraction of the social 
marginal cost.  Consequently, markets are unable to achieve 
allocative (Pareto) efficiency in the face of externalities, thereby 
failing to maximize total social welfare and leading to market failure.44  
Hardin’s tragedy is that of externalized costs.45 
3.  Externalized Benefits 
While the tragedy of open-access resources articulated by Hardin 
arises from the externalization of each user’s cost of using a resource, 
externalities are not limited solely to the unaccounted costs of an 
activity.46  The failure to internalize external benefits, or positive 
externalities, of an activity within the cost calculus has been 
recognized as leading to a related, albeit distinct, type of market 
failure.  Where positive externalities occur, the beneficiaries of a 
service enjoy that service without compensating those responsible for 
its production.47  Ecosystem services are a classic example of the type 
of benefits markets fail to provide efficiently.  Due to the often 
amorphous nature of ecosystem services and the difficulty in 
quantifying them, their benefits frequently are externalized from the 
economic calculus.  In an encomium to Hardin’s seminal thesis, the 
consequent underproduction of the services arising from this market 
failure has been described as the “tragedy of ecosystem services.”48  
This tragedy is that of externalized benefits. 
Forestland management decisions are unique in that they occur 
at the intersection of these tragedies, creating both positive and 
negative externalities with regard to global climate.  Forest 
ecosystems sequester carbon when conserved and emit carbon when 
 
 43. Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for 
Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (1991). 
 44. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348–49 
(1967). 
 45. See Lant, Ruhl, & Kraft, supra note 10, at 970. 
 46. See id. 
 47. Id. at 971. 
 48. Id. 
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converted, meaning that forests can act either to the benefit or 
detriment of the global community for climate regulation.  However, 
because private landowners currently have no means by which to seek 
recompense for the carbon sequestration their lands provide, society 
currently is able to “free-ride” on these benefits, enjoying their value 
but not sharing in the costs of their production.49  Correspondingly, 
just as these positive climate externalities are not currently included 
in the cost calculus of forestland management, neither are the 
negative externalities arising from forest management.  When forests 
are overharvested, or converted and developed to other uses, the 
carbon stored in these ecosystems is emitted to the atmosphere, 
contributing to global climate change and the tragedy of open-access 
resources that befalls the atmosphere.  Society collectively bears the 
costs of these actions in the form of heightened levels of atmospheric 
carbon and diminished biological carbon sequestration capacity while 
the landowner enjoys the exclusive benefits that accrue from these 
actions. 
D.  Averting Tragedy: Correcting Market Failure 
Correcting these market failures turns on the ability to bring 
externalized costs and benefits to bear on the parties responsible.  
Even in the absence of clearly defined property rights, such as is the 
case with open-access resources, negotiation can yield an 
economically efficient allocation of resources.50  Bargaining among 
affected parties can allow externalized costs to be included within the 
economic cost calculus, resulting in an internalization of costs and 
allowing the free market to dictate an efficient outcome regardless of 
each party’s liability.51  However, arriving at an efficient outcome 
requires the negotiation of each party affected, a proposition that 
includes costs.  As the number of affected parties increases, the 
administrative costs involved in negotiation between all necessary 
actors may quickly become prohibitively expensive.  Even when all 
parties can be brought to the table, rent seeking and other strategic 
behavior can vastly inflate the costs of negotiating an optimal 
outcome.52  Additionally, there may be little incentive for responsible 
 
 49. See Trista M. Patterson & Dana L. Coelho, Ecosystem Services: Foundations, 
Opportunities, and Challenges for the Forest Products Sector, 257 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 
1637, 1639 (2009). 
 50. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7 (1960). 
 51. See id. at 7–8. 
 52. See id. at 20. 
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parties to voluntarily enter into negotiations to internalize costs that 
would otherwise remain externalized.53  Due to the foregoing factors 
as well as costs associated with the subsequent policing and 
enforcement of such agreements, the negotiation of an optimal 
agreement may become very costly for private actors to undertake.  
These collective costs are termed “transaction costs,” and may exceed 
the benefits derived by internalization, leaving affected parties little 
choice but to bear these externalized costs.54  In instances like climate 
change, where externalities affect a global constituency, the sheer 
number of stakeholders overwhelms the ability of collective 
bargaining to achieve resolution, and some degree of government 
intervention is necessary to correct this market failure.55 
E.  Private and Public Goods 
1.  Private Goods 
Because the climate costs and benefits of forest management 
have yet to be monetized, they continue to be externalized from the 
economic calculus.56  As a result, the market can be expected to 
induce private forestlands to overproduce activities that create 
negative climate externalities and underproduce activities that create 
positive externalities.  Because forest landowners generally receive no 
compensation for the production of regulation functions, their lands 
are often developed to produce goods with clear, monetized market 
benefits.  These items are the result of the production function 
services provided by ecosystems, and are known as private goods.57  
Private forest goods include traditional commodities, such as timber 
and property development, and are characterized by excludability, 
which refers to the ability to control the use of a good or resource, 
and subtractability, which denotes the diminishment in value one user 
incurs for all other users of the resource.58  These characteristics allow 
private goods to be valued readily and easily exchanged in the 
marketplace. 
 
 53. Esty, supra note 41, at 591. 
 54. Demsetz, supra note 44, at 349. 
 55. See Esty, supra note 41, at 638, 652. 
 56. See Lant, Ruhl, & Kraft, supra note 10, at 972. 
 57. OSTROM & OSTROM, supra note 39, at 77–78. 
 58. Id. 
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2.  Public Goods 
In contrast to private goods, climate regulation and other 
ecosystem services cannot be easily quantified or monetized for ready 
inclusion within the marketplace.  The benefits derived from these 
services are neither easily excludable nor subtractable; rather, the 
carbon sequestration benefits forests provide are enjoyed by all of 
society through the maintenance of a well-regulated climate.  Items of 
this nature are termed public goods.59  While demand exists for the 
provision of public goods and the protection of the public trust, the 
inability to exclude users and extract compensation for the 
production of a public good means that no incentives exist for the 
market to produce these goods.  The dedication of lands to the 
production of private goods is further perpetuated by an inherent bias 
in U.S. common law against leaving land in an undeveloped state, 
deterring any remaining incentive for property owners to manage 
their lands for the provision of ecosystem services.60  This arises from 
an inherent utilitarian premise in common law that the development 
of resources invariably puts land to better and higher use, thereby 
maximizing social welfare.61  This results from the law’s premise that 
the value of best possible land use options will be reflected accurately 
in monetary terms.62  Beyond merely disincentivizing the retention of 
ecosystem services on private lands, common law correspondingly 
offers few options to redress those harmed from the loss of ecosystem 
services.  Because ecosystem services are not recognized under 
common property law, beneficiaries have no legal recourse when 
these services are lost.63  As a result, governments must intervene to 
correct the market’s failure in providing traditional public goods, such 
as public education, national defense, law enforcement, medical 
research, national transportation infrastructure, or the establishment 
of natural reserves such as parks, national forests or wildlife refuges. 
 
 59. OSTROM & OSTROM, supra note 39, at 75–76.  Public goods were first formally 
described by Paul A. Samuelson in The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV.  ECON.  & 
STAT.  387, 389 (1954). 
 60. See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 519, 590 (1996). 
 61. Lant, Ruhl, & Kraft, supra note 10, at 972. 
 62. Id. 
 63. J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, 108–109 (2007). 
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III. ORGANIZING PUBLIC ECONOMIES 
Goods and services are generally conceived of as occurring on a 
spectrum of excludability and subtractability.  Those that are 
perfectly excludable and subtractable are termed pure private goods, 
while those that are perfectly non-excludable and non-subtractable 
are described as pure public goods.64  In reality, most goods and 
services occupy a position somewhere between these extremes.  
These characteristics are important in determining the most effective 
means of providing and producing a particular good or service.  Items 
that tend to be more reminiscent of pure private goods are easily 
provided for and produced by the market.  Conversely, as items 
become more of a public good in nature, they become increasingly 
more difficult to provide through traditional markets.  Because the 
exclusion of users is infeasible for public goods, markets for these 
goods break down on the demand side, where users are unwilling to 
pay for something that freely accrues to them.  Cost-minimizing users 
have little incentive to contribute their share to supplying a good 
when they can continue enjoying it free of cost.65  Even if voluntary 
efforts to produce the good exist, the persistence of this free-ridership 
problem means that voluntary efforts are unlikely to produce a 
satisfactory amount of the public good. 
To compensate for the market’s inability to produce public 
goods, some form of collective action is necessary whereby 
beneficiaries are induced to pay their proportionate share for the 
production of the good while sanctions can be used to foreclose on 
free-riders.  Because no market demand exists for a non-excludable 
public good, government intervention is needed to induce the supply 
of this good through the creation of a collective consumption unit.66  
Collective consumption units are authoritative entities established to 
provide demand for a public good and levy compulsory assessments, 
taxes or user charges to ensure beneficiaries provide their 
proportionate share in the production of the public good.  An 
appropriate collective consumption unit is designed to include the 
beneficiaries of a public good within its boundaries while excluding 
 
 64. OSTROM & OSTROM, supra note 39, at 77. 
 65. Id. at 80–81. 
 66. Id. at 83. 
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those who do not benefit.67 
Once established, collective consumption units must make 
decisions over the provision and production of the good or service.  
Provision choices refer to the decisions over whether to provide the 
good at all, while production specifications refer to the actual 
processes involved in the creation of the good.68  Provision decisions 
affect the type, quantity and quality of goods and services furnished 
to the public, the type and degree of private regulation necessary, and 
the amount and type of revenue to be raised (e.g., taxes, bond 
measures).69  Once these decisions are established, the production 
aspect, or the actual technical processes by which the goods and 
services will be made, must be specified.  Unlike private goods, where 
the price conveys information about the demand for that good, tax-
supported expenditures convey little about the beneficiaries’ 
preferences—except their willingness to comply with tax laws rather 
than face incarceration.70  Consequently, collective consumption units 
must create alternate means of articulating user preferences over the 
provision of a public good. 
Once the provision decisions are made regarding the type and 
quantity of a public good to be supplied, a production unit must be 
established to aggregate technical factors of production to meet the 
provision specifications articulated by the collective consumption 
unit.  The organization of a production unit may occur in a variety of 
arrangements.  A collective consumption unit might vertically 
integrate and operate its own production unit (e.g., a municipality 
with its own fire or police department).71  Alternatively, it might 
contract with external private vendors in the production of the public 
good (e.g., a municipality that contracts with a private firm for snow 
removal services).72  In another scenario, a collective consumption 
unit might not organize a production unit at all, but, rather, establish 
service standards for the provision of a public good and relegate 
discretion for the production of that public good to consumers (e.g., a 
municipality that licenses refuse collection firms, but leaves it to the 
consumer to choose a private vendor and purchase service).73  Where 
 
 67. Esty, supra note 41, at 587–597. 
 68. OSTROM & OSTROM, supra note 39, at 86 
 69. Gatzweiler, supra note 33, at 300. 
 70. OSTROM & OSTROM, supra note 39, at 84. 
 71. Id. at 85. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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a collective consumption unit does not establish an in-house 
production unit, the organization of a public economy may 
encompass multiple autonomous parts, comprising various levels of 
government, private enterprises and voluntary associations.74  Under 
such circumstances, the government itself does not serve individual 
citizens.  Rather, public goods are produced by a variety of different 
public service industries, such as the police industry, the education 
industry, the water industry, the fire protection industry, the welfare 
industry, the health services industry, the transportation industry, and 
others.  While the role of the government will vary in the production 
unit of each public-service industry, most will have important private 
components. 
Organizing the provision and production factors of ecosystem 
public goods, however, differs from that of traditional public goods.  
Here the choice to provide an ecosystem service typically does not 
need to be made; it is already provided by the ecosystem.  Thus, the 
provision decision entails determining of whether to continue 
providing the good through the maintenance of the ecosystem that 
produces it.75  However, in contrast to traditional public goods, the 
provision decisions governing ecosystem public goods often are not 
directly made by a public body.  Rather, the amount and quality of a 
particular ecosystem service is dictated by the management decisions 
made on the lands that provide it.  This means that the decision of 
whether to provide a public service largely remains in the hands of 
private resource managers.76  This is indeed the case concerning U.S. 
forests, where private landholdings compose more than half of all 
domestic forestland.77  Further complexity is inherent, due to the fact 
that ecosystem services are provided across ecosystems, which span 
property and political boundaries.  Thus, decisions regarding the 
provision of ecosystem services must transcend political boundaries to 
be made at the scale in which they operate. 
IV. STRATEGIES FOR OVERCOMING MARKET FAILURES 
The tragedy of open-access resources is a failure to account for 
negative externalities, while the tragedy of ecosystem services is a 
failure to internalize positive externalities.  The emerging challenge 
 
 74. Id. at 87–88 
 75. Gatzweiler, supra note 33, at 300. 
 76. Lant, Ruhl, & Kraft, supra note 10, at 972. 
 77. See U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., INTERIM UPDATE 2000, supra note 11, at 27. 
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then becomes internalizing these costs and benefits within the 
economic calculus to correct the failure of the market to prevent 
resource use that perpetuates both tragedies.  Correcting these 
market failures will necessitate the internalization of both 
externalized costs and benefits, and will require: (1) inducing the 
provision of a public good when the provision decisions and factors of 
production largely are privately controlled; and (2) the creation of 
disincentives for activities that cause climate harm through the 
emission of carbon.  Government has traditionally played the role of 
correcting these market failures, and will again be critical to doing so 
in the context of forests and climate. 
Governments can approach the correction of market failures in 
several ways.  The policy instruments for achieving environmental 
objectives are typically bifurcated into two categories: regulatory, 
“command-and-control” approaches, and market or incentive-based 
mechanisms.78  Regulatory approaches provide firms with little 
flexibility, specifying compliance strategies for achieving a rigidly 
defined environmental benchmark.79  In contrast, market strategies 
provide firms with incentives to achieve a sustained level of 
environmental progress and offer great flexibility in compliance 
approaches.80  Under a purely regulatory regime, desired behavior is 
specified through a command-and-control approach, and compliance 
standards and methodologies are explicitly defined by a regulatory 
body.  Alternatively, market regimes take steps to valuate and 
monetize ecosystem benefits and harms previously externalized, 
allowing policymakers to harness the market in correcting behavior.  
Disincentives are created to internalize the costs of socially 
undesirable behavior while externalized benefits are recognized and 
monetized to incentivize desirable behavior.  Historically, 
environmental policy has utilized both of these approaches, or, 
depending upon the particular scenario, a combination of the two.81 
The advantages inherent to market approaches over command-
and-control policies have long been described, and include efficiency, 
transparency, cost-effectiveness, and the ability to foster investment 
 
 78. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The 
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988). 
 79. Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks through Economic Incentives, 13 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 155 (1988). 
 80. Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Economic Incentives for Environmental 
Protection: Integrating Theory and Practice, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 464, 465 (1992). 
 81. See id. at 465–67. 
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and innovation.82  Unlike command-and-control approaches, where 
behavior is mandated, market approaches allow individual firms to 
select an appropriate level of environmentally desirable behavior.  
Rather than specifying required behavior via external bureaucratic 
directives, market strategies retain operating decisions in the hands of 
those who are best qualified to make them—the affected firms.  
Under a market strategy, each firm is enabled to pursue its most cost-
effective level of environmental progress, equating abatement costs 
on the margin and achieving a given level of environmental quality 
for the least cost.83  While this latitude in compliance means that 
market approaches may not be as suitable for threshold damage 
functions with highly localized damages, market-based approaches 
are particularly suited in instances where more uniform mixing of 
pollution occurs over larger geographic areas, such as in climate 
change.84 
The most effective approach depends on the nature of the good 
or service to be provided.  In instances where the organization of a 
public economy has private good attributes, a quasi-market scheme 
can be developed in concert with more traditional regulatory 
schemes. 
Regulations can be used to establish regulatory targets, program 
rules and enforcement mechanisms while a market framework can 
allow for efficiency in complying with these targets and create 
incentives for regulated entities to go beyond mere compliance 
obligations.  This approach has been the basis for sulfur dioxide and 
nitrous dioxide markets established under the Clean Air Act.85  Both 
the market reward and the regulatory punishment are critical to the 
success of these markets, as one reinforces the other and clear 
enforcement provides certainty and demand. 
Additional financial mechanisms, such as subsidies, grants and 
tax measures also can be used to correct incentive alignment and 
induce desired behavior, complementing the regulatory and direct 
market approaches.  The ownership pattern of private forestlands is 
such that, for the climate market, such mechanisms may be essential 
to correct the market preference for large suppliers.  Over 10 million 
private parties own forestland in the US, but only about 9,000 of them 
 
 82. See Stewart, supra note 79, at 155; see also Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 78, at 171. 
 83. See Richard G. Newell & Robert N. Stavins, Cost Heterogeneity and the Potential 
Savings from Market-Based Policies, 23 J. REG. ECON. 43, 49 (2003). 
 84. Hahn & Stavins, supra note 80, at 465. 
 85. Clean Air Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (1995). 
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have properties totaling 10,000 acres or more.86  In such cases, prior 
experience shows that shifting small landowner behavior toward 
providing public goods (such as for habitat or water quality) have 
been largely effected through grants and subsidies.87 
V. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
That some vein of government intervention is necessary to 
correct the market failures affecting forests and climate change has 
certainly been established above.  The specific means that the 
government must take, however, must still be discussed.  To correct 
these market failures, the role of the federal government will be 
tripartite, and will require: 
Inducement of demand for carbon through the underlying 
regulatory structure of the markets via cap-and-trade legislation that 
includes forest and other land sequestration as part of the system; 
Definition of the “rules of the game” for the offset and trading 
market, including a definition of biological carbon compliance units 
that recognizes the integrity of the ecosystem in which they are 
embedded; and 
Investment in the foundational infrastructure that provides the 
basic services necessary to bring these “ecosystem services” to 
market. 
A.  Establishment of National Emissions Targets 
The public good nature of ecosystem services has historically 
frustrated their provision through traditional markets.  Given their 
amorphous nature, the difficulty in quantifying, valuating and 
monetizing these services obstructs their ready inclusion in the 
market.88  Climate regulation is the most likely to prove amenable to 
the type of quantification and valuation that will allow monetization.  
The quantity of carbon contained within a forest ecosystem is 
relatively straightforward to determine.  Forest growth rates can be 
used to determine carbon sequestration, while levels of carbon 
 
 86. Brett J. Butler, Family Forest Owners of the United States, 2006, in Gen. Tech. Rep. 
NRS-27 at 55 (2008). 
 87. See Patrick Sullivan, et al., The Conservation Reserve Program: Economic Implications 
for Rural America, Agric. Econ. Report No. 834 (2004). 
 88. See generally, NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR PROTECTING THE 
ENVIRONMENT 1–5 (2004) (noting the difficulty in calculating the level of taxes, subsidies and 
other environmental programs necessary to capture the true cost of pollution). 
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storage can be calculated from the total volume of on-site biomass.89  
Thus, carbon may act as an accurate and easily quantifiable proxy90 
for the climate regulation services provided by forests, and therefore 
allows inclusion within a market framework.  Inventorying extant 
carbon and then monitoring the flux of carbon in and out of a forest 
ecosystem can allow for an accounting of the positive and negative 
effects of forest management on the climate regulation ecosystem.91  
This would provide a basis for incorporating climate considerations 
into forest management decisions.  Despite the ready quantification 
of carbon, its value in climate regulation has yet to be incorporated 
into the economic calculus beyond incipient, voluntary carbon 
markets.  While voluntary markets have been assistive in the 
development of inchoate carbon markets, a lesson stressed by 
economists is particularly apropos: consumers are unlikely to pay for 
something they can get for free.92  Consequently, voluntary 
approaches like donations or non-compliance offset markets have 
resulted in an undervaluation of carbon.93 
While carbon may present a strong, albeit imperfect, proxy for 
the incorporation of forest climate regulation services into the 
market, this by itself does not induce demand for carbon as a good.  
For public ecosystem goods whose enjoyment is related to the 
consumption of a private good, such as the protection of watersheds 
for the provision of clean water, externalized costs and benefits 
related to the public good can be internalized into the price of the 
private good for which clear demand already exists (e.g., payments to 
landowners protecting watershed lands financed via a tax levied on 
the cost of drinking water).94  Because the enjoyment of the benefits 
of forest climate regulation are not associated with the pre-existing 
consumption of a private good, they remain un-excludable, and 
 
 89. ZACH WILLEY & BILL CHAMEIDES, HARNESSING FARMS AND FORESTS IN THE LOW-
CARBON ECONOMY: HOW TO CREATE, MEASURE, AND VERIFY GREENHOUSE GAS OFFSETS 
56–57 (2007). 
 90. While carbon itself can provide a proxy for the climate benefits conveyed by a forest 
ecosystem, a proxy is by nature a simplified indicator.  The climate benefits forests afford 
depend on a complex, ecologically resilient ecosystem; protocols for quantifying forest climate 
benefits must include parameters that account for the ecological integrity of ecosystems, not 
merely coarse quantities of carbon. 
 91. See ZACH WILLEY & BILL CHAMEIDES, supra note 89, at 55–57. 
 92. B. Kelsey Jack et al., Designing Payments for Ecosystem Services: Lessons from 
Previous Experience with Incentive-Based Mechanisms, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9465, 9468 
(2008). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. 
Wayburn_final_PD edt.doc 7/30/2010  4:43:58 PM 
Summer 2010]        FEDERAL POLICY IN ECOSYSTEM SERVICE MARKETS 407 
therefore lack demand even when quantification is possible.  
Consequently, compulsory mechanisms for demand generation are 
necessary to valuate and create a market for carbon.95 
Congress is currently in the process of considering several 
different pieces of legislation to create compulsory mechanisms for 
carbon demand generation.96  These mechanisms would internalize 
the climate harms caused by carbon emissions through the 
establishment of a national cap on emissions that contribute to global 
climate change.97  This policy would limit, or “cap,” the total amount 
of emissions allowable from the U.S.  economy, and require emitters 
to purchase carbon emission allowances for the emissions they 
produce.98  The level of the emissions cap would be controlled simply 
by the quantity of allowances made available. 
In contrast to a purely command-and-control strategy, a cap-and-
trade approach leverages the ability of the market to achieve 
emissions reductions at the least cost by allowing firms to equate 
compliance costs on the margin.99  Cap-and-trade enables emitters to 
comply with an emissions cap either by undertaking emissions 
reductions in-house, or by purchasing emissions allowances from 
other entities.  Firms would be expected to reduce emissions in-house 
until the marginal cost of abatement exceeded the price of a carbon 
emission allowance—at which point carbon emission allowances 
would be purchased to cover the remainder of emissions. 
By allowing allowance trading and the participation of entities 
not included under the cap in the creation of emissions reductions, a 
cap-and-trade regime enables those with the lowest abatement costs 
to reduce emissions.  This produces incentives for entities to innovate 
new and more effective means of creating emissions reductions—
incentives that would not exist if a purely command-and-control 
approach had been taken.  Under a cap-and-trade regime, demand 
for activities that sequester and store carbon, such as forest 
conservation, could be used to compensate landowners for the 
previously externalized carbon sequestration value of their land.  
Incentivizing these activities would induce the provision and 
production of public ecosystem service goods, such as the climate 
 
 95. See id. 
 96. See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(2009); The Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S.1733, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 97. See id. § 311, et seq. (HR 2454). 
 98. See id. § 311, et seq. (HR 2454). 
 99. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 80, at 464–465. 
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regulation benefits of forests, where decisions are under private 
management.  Further, influencing the ecosystem service factors of 
provision and production through incentives, rather than regulation, 
is far more politically tractable than command-and-control regulation.  
This is because landowners are much more likely to embrace financial 
payments for the provision of these services, and a market approach 
to influencing behavior on private lands is far simpler than a 
regulatory approach, where federalism reserves primary regulatory 
land use for state and local governments.100 
B.  Establishment of Program Rules 
By definition, public goods are inherently difficult to quantify 
and monetize.  This characteristic has inhibited their inclusion in the 
marketplace and resulted in their subsequent underprovision.101  
Finding methods by which to include these ecosystem service benefits 
within the market can assist in correcting this market failure.  In many 
respects, climate regulation is unique from other ecosystem services 
in that carbon can be used as an indicator of the climate regulation 
services provided by a particular ecosystem.  Biological carbon may 
be quantified with relative ease, providing a means for valuating and 
including climate regulation ecosystem services within a traditional 
market framework.  Forests and other carbon emissions sectors that 
can produce credible emissions reductions above a business-as-usual 
baseline may be incorporated into the market through the creation of 
a carbon “offset” program that monetizes ecosystem climate 
benefits.102  These offsets would provide guaranteed carbon emission 
reductions, and could be used for compliance in lieu of emission 
allowances under a cap-and-trade program.  Because offsets are 
premised on a reduction of atmospheric carbon functionally 
equivalent to the emissions they counteract, offsets are theoretically 
fungible with allowances.  As a result, emitting entities may use 
offsets for compliance without eroding the integrity of the overall 
emissions cap. 
While carbon offers a suitable private good proxy for some 
measure of the public good climate regulation services provided by 
forests, carbon itself is only a proxy, which is, by its nature, a 
 
 100. Blake Hudson & Erika S. Weinthal, Seeing the Global Forest for the Trees: How US 
Federalism can Coexist with Global Governance of Forests, 1 J. NAT.  RESOURCES POL’Y RES. 
353, 353 (2009). 
 101. OSTROM & OSTROM, supra note 39, at 81. 
 102. See Patterson & Coelho, supra note 49, at 1640. 
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simplified indicator of a much more complex system.103  For example, 
forests maintain local environmental conditions through a variety of 
services, such as increased precipitation, greater moisture retention, 
and the moderation of spring runoff, all of which impact climate.104  
These are not reflected in the quantity of carbon, per se, that is 
embedded in the forest.  Further, the climate regulation services 
provided by individual forests are embedded in a larger, integrated 
forest ecosystem that is acted upon by a variety of endogenous and 
exogenous drivers.  Forest ecosystems are not static and are subject to 
a suite of disturbance and regenerative processes, the exact nature of 
which is contingent upon the ecosystem itself.105  Management that 
seeks only to maximize gross quantities of carbon without heeding the 
overall health, resilience and integrity of the larger ecosystem itself 
misses this point.  Managing solely for the maximization of forest 
carbon in the shorter term without providing for the broader 
ecological integrity of the forest ecosystem is ultimately likely to 
heighten the forest’s susceptibility to disturbance.106  This, in turn, will 
lead to attendant carbon emissions, resulting in the erosion of the 
overall climate regulation services offered by the forest ecosystem 
itself.  As a result, while quantifying carbon flux in an ecosystem 
provides a measure of its overall effect on climate regulation, carbon 
alone is not an effective proxy unless certain parameters of the 
ecological health can be included in the quantification of carbon 
within that ecosystem.  Simply put, managing forests for climate does 
not mean management for carbon and vice versa. 
Accordingly, while the use of carbon offsets is an important step 
toward internalizing the climate regulation services ecosystems 
provide, carbon is only an indicator of the climate regulation forest 
ecosystems provide.  Parochial policies that narrowly focus on carbon 
miss this broader point, and demonstrate a fundamental lack of 
understanding of the climate regulation services ecosystems 
provide.107 
 
 103. See Margaret A.  Palmer & Solanges Filoso, Restoration of Ecosystem Services for 
Environmental Markets, 325 SCIENCE 575, 575–76 (2009). 
 104. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: 
CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS, 603 (2005). 
 105. See Virginia H. Dale et al., Climate Change and Forest Disturbances, 51 BIOSCIENCE 
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Wayburn_final_PD edt.doc 7/30/2010  4:43:58 PM 
410 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 20:385 
This reality of forest ecosystems signifies the necessity of 
acknowledging the complexity of the ecosystems in which biological 
carbon is bound, and viewing these systems holistically rather than 
narrowly in the production of carbon units. 
Valuating carbon on forestlands will require assurance as to the 
quantity of carbon sequestered and the durability, or permanence, of 
its storage.  For carbon sequestration from forests to indeed offset 
carbon emissions, the government must establish program rules to 
guarantee the credibility of forest and other biological offsets.  These 
standards must take measures to guarantee the authenticity of carbon 
reductions marketed as offsets, and require that the offsets are of high 
quality, are additional to what would have occurred absent the offset 
program, are permanent, and are verifiable by an external, third-party 
verifier.  Establishing rigorous rules of exchange and enforcement will 
be critical to reducing the uncertainty surrounding an offset program 
and inducing investment.  While often thought of as a collaborative 
venture between the government, emitters and landowners, it is 
important to recognize the critical role the government must play 
from an enforcement perspective.  From a game theory perspective, 
environmental trading is akin to a three-way, non-cooperative game, 
in which self-interested buyers and sellers of environmental credits 
have incentives to collude against the public interest in the 
diminishment of quality standards, and therefore, decrease their costs 
of doing business.108  Consequently, the government must establish 
rigorous accounting protocols to protect the public interest and 
ensure the climate credibility of a carbon offset program. 
C.  Investment in Infrastructure 
Both private and public forests are important providers of 
ecosystem services such as carbon sequestration.  However, as these 
forests operate under different ownership regimes and management 
objectives, maximizing the climate benefits of these respective 
ownerships will require correspondingly distinct solutions.  As such, a 
common, but differentiated approach will be needed to maximize the 
provision and production of carbon storage benefits from both 
private and public forests.  The potential of these lands to reduce 
atmospheric carbon must be recognized, and investment in these 
lands should be commensurate with our level of investment in 
 
 108. Dennis M. King, Managing Environmental Trades: Lessons from Hollywood, 
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reducing emissions in other sectors, such as energy. 
1.  Private Forests 
As noted above, the federal government has traditionally helped 
bear the cost of developing private markets that serve the public 
good, as with the development of the national road system, dams, and 
power plants on which myriad private businesses depend.109  In each 
case, the government has largely, if not entirely, borne the costs of 
developing and maintaining the physical infrastructure upon which 
many private commercial enterprises rely.  Funding to lower the cost 
of capital is made available through grants, low-cost loans and various 
subsidies such as tax and production credits.110  Fundamentally, there 
is a public-private partnership to develop these markets, with the 
public capital bearing the costs of establishing, and in some cases 
maintaining the basic shared infrastructure and the private capital 
bearing the costs of producing the finished goods for market.111  This 
same role is essential in the development of ecosystem service 
markets: the public capital should partner to bear the cost of ensuring 
the physical land infrastructure is intact, and the private capital, 
through the carbon market, should bear the cost of developing and 
ensuring the additional emissions reductions. 
In this case, the shared infrastructure is that of land, especially 
forests, which cuts across public and private borders in the production 
of essential services.  With three out of every five acres in the lower 
forty-eight states owned by private owners,112 the sharing of 
infrastructure costs is especially pertinent, as these acres are subject 
to enormous threat of conversion and degradation.113  Without 
investment at a scale beyond what individual owners can provide, 
these ecosystem services will decline and disappear due to the 
fragmentation and degradation of the overall system upon which they 
depend.  As the value of development out-competes that of 
maintaining land in a more natural and productive state, parcelization 
and conversion eat away at the landscape, resulting in the proverbial 
death by a thousand small cuts.  As this occurs, the possibility of 
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hitting climate targets, not to mention the disappearance of any 
additional contribution to emissions reductions of renewable fuels, 
declines steadily.  The United States is then forced to find other 
means to provide these reductions at significant, and normally great, 
expense.114 
To ensure that forest and other natural lands maintain current 
stores and have the capacity to increase them, the federal government 
should provide an investment parallel to that for the development of 
alternative and efficient energy plants: grants, low cost of capital and 
tax credits.  In a time of federal deficits and stringency, investment for 
the conservation and restoration of more natural habitats will need to 
be tied to the overall climate policy and coordinated with existing 
related programs, such as those under the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture; the U.S. Forest Service; the Natural Resources 
Conservation Service; and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.  
Funding should be derived from a set-aside of allowances and the 
proceeds from the auction thereof and at a level at least 
commensurate with the funding being established for the prevention 
of international deforestation.  Or, more rationally, in an amount that 
compensates for the provision of sequestration services or the 
production of alternative, renewable woody biomass energy.  This 
would argue for an allowance allocation of between five and twenty 
percent for the acquisition of conservation easements on private lands 
to maintain their sequestration services, and for grants to fund 
restoration activities on public and private lands.  These “restoration” 
grants would cover costs of resilience restoration and adaptive 
management, such as thinning, fire risk management and 
reforestation.  In turn, such activities would generate significant 
employment in rural resource dependent communities.  Investments 
in natural lands management, primarily forestry, are in fact the most 
leveraged of any job investment that the country can make.115  That is, 
they bring not only climate and other ecosystem service benefits; they 
are also major economic stimulants for job creation and retention. 
Overall, the federal government must develop institutional 
frameworks that shift from a narrow management focus on private 
lands to a more holistic management approach.  It must also build 
institutional capacity to conduct complex ecological, social and 
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 115. See HANS HOOGEVEEN ET AL., DESIGNING A FOREST FINANCING MECHANISM 
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economic analyses to facilitate regulatory decisions in a transparent 
manner.116  Effective federal climate policies must address the 
substantial loss of private forestlands to conversion and development 
each year as well as acknowledge the implications these losses have 
for our future ability to combat climate change.  The development of 
a rigorous carbon offset program in concert with a mechanism for 
compulsory demand generation to accurately valuate these carbon 
offsets will provide landowners with an important new source of 
income for the provision of climate services. 
Indeed, with the majority of U.S. forestlands being privately 
owned, this approach will position private landowners in a position of 
unique global competitiveness to attract investment in emissions 
reductions, providing additional economic return from the investment 
made by the federal government in the basic natural physical 
infrastructure.  Private lands will provide the bulk of increases in 
sequestration services for future reductions in emissions (as they are 
the most depleted in comparison with public lands) while also helping 
maintain the base of current sequestration.117 
2.  Public Forests 
Though the majority of U.S. forestlands are privately held, public 
lands are also an important source of carbon storage and 
sequestration.  Federal forests currently compose about a third of all 
forested land in the United States, while another tenth is under state 
or other public ownership.118  However, the exacerbation of stressors 
and existing disturbances through climate change is increasingly 
threatening the carbon sequestration and storage capacity of these 
federal lands.119  Government investment must target restoration of 
the ecological integrity of federal lands to ensure the resilience and 
durability of the climate benefits they afford. 
The budgeting processes used by the Forest Service have also 
contributed to the climate change risks faced by federal forests.  
During the appropriations process, negotiations with the Secretary of 
Agriculture, Office of Management and Budget, and Congress focus 
largely on funding for budget line items that are particularly 
controversial or economically important.120  When the finalized 
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budget is returned to the Forest Service, it often bears little 
resemblance to the budget proposal initially submitted.  Production 
goals and associated funding predominately focus on commodity 
resource programs with tangible, easily measured outputs, while goals 
and objectives for non-commodity resource programs can fall by the 
wayside. 
The hybrid budgeting approach used by the Forest Service was 
reinforced by the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources 
Planning Act of 1974 (“RPA”).121  The RPA was enacted in the 1970s 
after “increasing public criticism of the Forest Service for its forest 
management practices such as clear cutting.”122  The RPA directed the 
Forest Service to develop a long-range, strategic plan for the goals 
and objectives under which the national forests were to be managed.  
During the late 1970s, the RPA served as the basis for the annual 
budget development process, and required forest supervisors to 
submit at least one budget alternative that responded to the goals 
articulated under the RPA program.123  This enabled the Forest 
Service to emphasize non-commodity forest management practices in 
their budget requests.  Increasing appropriations to forest 
management activities were attributed to the RPA program’s ability 
to highlight these activities in the annual appropriations process, as 
well as the Carter administration’s overall commitment to non-
commodity production goals.124  However, any apparent influence the 
RPA program goals had on the annual appropriations process quickly 
vanished with the Reagan administration.  Despite the multiple use 
goals of the RPA program, appropriations for many resource 
programs sharply declined while the budgeting emphasis drastically 
swung toward commodity production.125  To ensure that federal 
forests are able to provide critical ecosystem services such as carbon 
sequestration, budgeting processes must reflect the substantial non-
commodity value of forests and provide funding for sustaining them.  
The allocation of emission allowances and income from the auction 
thereof, as noted above, should serve as the source of such budget 
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revenues. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Climate regulation by forests should be the first global scale 
ecosystem service to be monetized through and in the private 
marketplace.  Government policy that sets appropriate targets for 
reducing carbon emissions through cap and trade is essential in 
creating market demand and the standards to control it.  Equally, 
federal policy must recognize that the sequestration of carbon by 
forests alone is an incomplete recognition of forest climate regulation.  
Program rules, such as those for the definition of regulatory 
compliance units of forest carbon, must include ecosystem function 
parameters.  Federal policy must also recognize that the markets 
alone are insufficient to pay for climate services.  To fully realize a  
forest carbon market and achieve national climate goals, federal 
investment will be needed in the natural physical infrastructure of 
forests—investment in a manner comparable to that for developing 
the physical infrastructure essential to meeting our national goals for 
alternative energy and transportation. 
 
